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Abstract
Machine learning (ML) is increasingly deployed
in real world contexts, supplying actionable
insights and forming the basis of automated
decision-making systems. While issues result-
ing from biases pre-existing in training data have
been at the center of the fairness debate, these sys-
tems are also affected by technical and emergent
biases, which often arise as context-specific arti-
facts of implementation. This position paper inter-
prets technical bias as an epistemological problem
and emergent bias as a dynamical feedback phe-
nomenon. In order to stimulate debate on how to
change machine learning practice to effectively
address these issues, we explore this broader view
on bias, stress the need to reflect on epistemology,
and point to value-sensitive design methodologies
to revisit the design and implementation process
of automated decision-making systems.
1. Introduction
Data-driven decision-making is rapidly being introduced in
high-stakes social domains such as medical clinics, criminal
justice, and public infrastructure. The proliferation of biases
in these systems leads to new forms of erroneous decision-
making, causing disparate treatment or outcomes across
populations (Barocas & Selbst, 2016). The ML community
is working hard to understand and mitigate the unintended
and harmful behavior that may emerge from poor design
of real-world automated decision-making systems (Amodei
et al., 2016). While many technical tools are being proposed
to mitigate these errors, there is insufficient understanding
of how the machine learning design and deployment prac-
tice can safeguard critical human values such as safety or
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fairness. The AI Now Institute identifies “a deep need for
interdisciplinary, socially aware work that integrates the
long history of bias research from the social sciences and
humanities into the field of AI research” (Campolo et al.,
2017).
How can ML practitioners, often lacking consistent lan-
guage to go beyond technical descriptions and solutions to
“well-defined problems,” engage with fundamentally human
aspects in manner that is constructive rather than dismissive
or reductive? And how may other disciplines help to enrich
the practice? In this paper, we argue that practitioners and
researchers need to take a step back and adopt a broader and
more holistic view on bias than currently advocated in many
classrooms and professional fora. Our discussion empha-
sizes the need to reflect on questions of epistemology and
underlines the importance of dynamical behavior in data-
driven decision-making. We do not provide full-fledged
answers to the problems presented, but point to methodolo-
gies in value-sensitive design and self-reflection to contend
more effectively with issues of fairness, accountability, and
transparency throughout the design and implementation pro-
cess of automated decision-making systems.
2. A Broader View On Bias
Most literature addressing issues of fairness in ML has fo-
cused on the ways in which models can inherit pre-existing
biases from training data. Limiting ourselves to these bi-
ases is problematic in two ways. Firstly, it narrows us to
look at how these biases lead to allocative harm; a primar-
ily economic view of how systems allocate or withhold an
opportunity or resource, such as being granted a loan or
held in prison. In her NIPS 2017 keynote, Kate Crawford
made the case that at the root of all forms of allocative harm
are biases that cause representational harm. This perspec-
tive requires us to move beyond biases in the data set and
“think about the role of ML in harmful representations of
human identity,” and how these biases “reinforce the subor-
dination of groups along the lines of identity” and “affect
how groups or individuals are understood socially,” thereby
also contributing to harmful attitudes and cultural beliefs
in the longer term (Crawford, 2017). It is fair to say that
representation issues have been largely neglected by the ML
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community, potentially because they are hard to formalize
and track.
Responsible representation requires analyses beyond scru-
tinizing a training set, including questioning how sensitive
attributes might be represented by different features and
classes of models and what governance is needed to com-
plement the model. Additionally, while ML systems are
increasingly implemented to provide “actionable insights”
and guide decisions in the real world, the core methods still
fail to effectively address the inherent dynamic nature of in-
teractions between the automated decision making process
and the environment or individuals that are acted upon. This
is particularly true in contexts where observations or human
responses (such as clicks and likes) are fed back along the
way to update the algorithm’s parameters, allowing biases
to be further reinforced and amplified.
The tendency of ML-based decision-making systems to for-
malize and reinforce socially sensitive phenomena neces-
sitates a broader taxonomy of biases that includes risks
beyond those pre-existing in the data. As argued by Fried-
man and Nissenbaum in the nascent days of value-sensitive
design methodologies, two other sources of bias naturally
occur when designing and employing computer systems,
namely technical bias and emergent bias (Friedman, 1996;
Friedman & Nissenbaum, 1996).
While understanding pre-existing bias has lent itself rea-
sonably well to statistical approaches for understanding a
given data set, technical and emergent bias require engaging
with the domain of application and the ways in which the
algorithm is used and integrated. For automated decision-
making tools to be responsibly integrated in any context, it is
critical that designers (1) assess technical bias by reflecting
on their epistemology and understanding the values of users
and stakeholders, and (2) assess emergent bias by studying
the feedback mechanisms that create intimate, ever-evolving
coupling between algorithms and the environment they act
upon.
3. Technical Bias Is About Epistemology
Friedman describes a source of technical bias as “the attempt
to make human constructs amenable to computers - when,
for example, we quantify the qualitative, make discrete
the continuous, or formalize the nonformal” (Friedman,
1996). This form of bias originates from all the tools used
in the process of turning data into a model that can make
predictions. While technical bias is domain-specific, we
identify four sources in the machine learning pipeline.
Firstly, both collected and existing data X are at some point
measured and transformed into a computer readable scale.
Depending on the objects measured, each variable may have
a different scale, such as nominal, ordinal, interval, or ratio.
Consider for example Netflix’s decision to let viewers rate
movies with “likes” instead of a 1-5 star rating. As such,
movie ratings moved from an ordinal scale (a number score
in which order matters, but the interval between scores does
not) to a nominal scale (mutually exclusive labels: you like a
movie or you don’t). While the nominal scale might make it
easier for viewers to rate movies, it affects how viewers are
represented and what content gets recommended by the ML
system. As such, these choices can produce measurement
bias, so careful consideration is necessary to understand its
effects on system outcomes (Hardt & Barocas, 2017).
Secondly, based on gathered data X and available domain
knowledge, practitioners engineer features and select model
classes. Features ϕ(X) can be the available data attributes,
transformations thereof based on knowledge and hypotheses,
or generated in an automated fashion. Since each feature
can be regarded as a model of attributes of the system or
population under study, it is relevant to ask how represen-
tative it is as a proxy and why it may be predictive of the
outcome. Models are used to make predictions based on
features. A model class f(·; θ), with parameters θ, should
be selected based on the complexity of the phenomenon in
question and the amount and quality of the available data. Is
the individual or object that is subject to the decision easily
reduced to numbers or equations to begin with? What infor-
mation in the data is inherently lost by virtue of the mapping
f(ϕ(X); θ) having a limited complexity? The process of
representation, abstraction and compression can be collec-
tively described as inducing modeling bias. ML can be seen
as a compression problem in which complex phenomena are
stored as a pattern in a finite-dimensional parameter space.
From an information theoretic perspective, modeling bias
influences the extent to which distortion can be minimized
when reconstructing a phenomenon from a compressed or
sampled version of the original (Cover & Thomas, 2012;
Dobbe et al., 2017).
Thirdly, label data Y is used to represent the output of
the model. Training labels may be the actual outcome for
historical cases, or some discretized or proxy version in
cases where the actual outcomes cannot be measured or
exactly quantified. Consider for example the use of records
of arrest to predict crime rather than the facts of whether
the crime was actually committed. How representative are
such records of real crime across all subpopulations? What
core information do they miss for representing the intended
classes? And what bias lies hidden in them? We propose to
refer to such issues as label bias.
Lastly, given a certain parameterization (ϕ(·), f(·, θ)) and
training data (X,Y ), a model is trained and tuned to opti-
mize certain objectives. At this stage, various metrics may
inform the model builder on where to tweak the model. Do
we minimize the number of false positives or false neg-
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atives? In recidivism prediction, a false positive may be
someone who incorrectly gets sentenced to prison, whereas
a false negative poses a threat to safety by failing to recog-
nize a high-threat individual. There are inherent trade-offs
between prioritizing for equal prediction accuracy across
groups versus for an equal likelihood of false positives and
negatives across groups (Chouldechova, 2016; Kleinberg
et al., 2017). Technical definitions of fairness are motivated
by different metrics, illuminating the inherent ambiguity
and context-dependence of such issues. For a given context,
what is the right balance? And who gets to decide? We coin
the effects of these trade-offs optimization bias.
The many questions posed above illuminate the range of
places in the machine learning design process where issues
of epistemology arise: they require justification and often
value judgment. Our theory of knowledge and the way we
formalize and solve problems determines how we represent
and understand sensitive phenomena. How do we represent
phenomena in ways that are deemed correct? What evidence
is needed in order to justify an action or decision? What are
legitimate classes or outcomes of a model? And how do we
deal with inherent trade-offs of fairness? These challenges
are deeply context-specific, often ethical, and challenge us
to understand our epistemology and that of the domain we
are working in.
The detrimental effects of overlooking these questions in
practice are obvious in high-stakes domains, such as pre-
dictive policing and sentencing, where the decision to treat
crime as a prediction problem reduces the perceived au-
tonomy of individuals, fated to either commit a crime or
act within the law. Barabas et al. argue that rather than
prediction, “machine learning models should be used to
surface covariates that are fed into a causal model for under-
standing the social, structural and psychological drivers of
crime” (Barabas et al., 2018). This is a strong message with
many challenges, but it points in the right direction: in these
contexts, machine learning models should facilitate rather
than replace the critical eye of the human expert. It forces
practitioners and researchers to be humble and reflect on
how our own skills and tools may benefit or hurt an existing
decision-making process.
4. Emergent Bias Is About Dynamics
Complementing pre-existing and technical biases, “emer-
gent bias arises only in a context of use by real users [...] as
a result of a change in societal knowledge, user population,
or cultural values.” (Friedman, 1996). Recently, convincing
examples of emergent bias have surfaced in contexts where
ML is used to automate or mediate human decisions. In
predictive policing, where discovered crime data (e.g., ar-
rest records) are used to predict the location of new crimes
and determine police deployment, runaway feedback loops
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Figure 1. A Simple Feedback Model
can cause increasing surveillance of particular neighbor-
hoods regardless of the true crime rate (Ensign et al., 2018),
leading to over-policing of “high-risk” individuals (Stroud,
2016). In optimizing for attention, recommendation sys-
tems may have a tendency to turn towards the extreme
and radical (Tufekci, 2018). When machine learning sys-
tems are unleashed in feedback with society, they may be
more accurately described as reinforcement learning sys-
tems, performing feedback control (Recht, 2018). Therefore,
a decision-making system has its own dynamics, which can
be modified by feedback, potentially causing bias to accrue
over time. To conceptualize these ideas at a high level, we
adopt the system formulation depicted in Figure 1.
The machine learning system acts on the environment
through decisions, control actions, or interventions. From
the environment, the decision maker considers observations,
historical data, measurements and responses, conceivably
updating its model in order to steer the environment in a
beneficial direction. For example, in the case of predictive
policing, ‘the environment’ describes a city and its citizens,
and ‘the decision maker’ is the police department, which
determines where to send police patrols or invest in social
interventions.
The dynamical perspective offered by the conception of a
feedback model allows for a focus on interactions, which
can add clarity to debates over key issues like fairness and
algorithmic accountability. Situations with completely dif-
ferent fairness interpretations may have identical static ob-
servational metrics (properties of the joint distribution of
input, model and output), and thus a causal or dynamic
model is necessary to distinguish them (Hardt et al., 2016).
On the other hand, a one-step feedback model, incorpo-
rating temporal indicators of well-being for individuals af-
fected by decisions, offers a way of comparing competing
definitions of fairness (Liu et al., 2018). Similarly, calls
for “interpretability” and proposed solutions often omit key
operative words – Interpretable to whom? And for what
purpose? (Kohli et al., 2018). The dynamic viewpoint adds
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clarity to these questions by focusing on causes and effects
of decision making systems, and situating interpretability in
context.
Beyond providing a more realistic and workable frame of
thinking about bias and related issues, the feedback sys-
tem perspective may also allow inspiration to be drawn
from areas of Systems Theory that have traditionally studied
feedback and dynamics. For instance, the field of System
Identification uses statistical methods to build mathematical
models of dynamical systems from measured data, often
to be employed to control dynamical systems with strict
safety requirements, such as airplanes or electric power sys-
tems (Ljung, 1998; A˚stro¨m & Murray, 2010). Inspiration
may be drawn from the rich literature on closed-loop identi-
fication, which considers the identification of models with
data gathered during operation, while the same model is
also used to safeguard a system (Van den Hof, 1998). That
said, modeling socio-technical systems is more challenging
than engineered systems. The complexity of modeled phe-
nomena, the role of unmodeled phenomena such as external
economic factors, and slower temporal dynamics all pose
barriers to directly applying existing engineering principles.
5. Our Positionality Shapes Our Epistemology
As ML practitioners and researchers, we are wired to ana-
lyze challenges in ways that abstract, formalize and reduce
complexity. It is natural for us to think rigorously about
technical roots of biases in the systems we design, and
propose and techno-fixes to prevent negative impact from
their proliferation. However, it is of crucial importance to
acknowledge that the methods and approaches we use to
reduce, formalize, and gather feedback from experiments
are themselves inherent sources of bias. Epistemologies
differ tremendously from application to application and ulti-
mately shape the way a decision-maker justifies decisions
and affects individuals. Technology intimately touches and
embodies values deemed critical in employing the intended
decision-making system. As such, we need to go beyond
our formal tools and analyses to engage with others and re-
flect on our epistemology. In doing so, we aim to determine
responsible ways in which technology can help put values
into practice, and understand its fundamental limitations.
With a plethora of issues surfacing, it is easy to either con-
sider banning ML altogether, or otherwise dismiss requests
to fundamentally revisit its role in enabling data-driven
decision-making in sensitive environments. Instead, we
propose three principles to nourish debate on the middle
ground:
1: Do fairness forensics (Crawford, 2017). Keep track
of biases in an open and transparent way and engage in
constructive dialogue with domain experts, to understand
proven ways of formalizing complex phenomena and to
breed awareness about how bias works and when/where
users should be cautious.
2: Acknowledge that your positionality shapes your epis-
temology (Takacs, 2003). Our personal backgrounds, the
training we received, the people we represent or interact
with all have an impact on how we look at and formalize
problems. As ML practitioners, we should set aside time
and energy for critical self-reflection, to identify our own
biases and blind spots, to harbor communication with the
groups affected by the systems we design, and to under-
stand where we should enrich our epistemology with other
viewpoints.
3: Perform value-sensitive design. Determine what values
are relevant in building a decision-making system and how
they might be embodied or challenged in the design and
implementation by engaging with users and other affected
stakeholders (Van den Hoven, 2007; Friedman et al., 2013).
As Takacs describes it, the benefits of self-reflection go well
beyond arriving at the “best solution” to a complex prob-
lem (Takacs, 2003; 2002). “This means learning to listen
with open minds and hearts, learning to respect different
ways of knowing the world borne of different identities and
experiences, and learning to examine and re-examine one’s
own worldviews. [...] When we constantly engage to un-
derstand how our positionality biases our epistemology, we
greet the world with respect, interact with others to explore
and cherish their differences, and live life with a fuller sense
of self as part of a web of community.”
As machine learning systems rapidly change our informa-
tion gathering and shape our decisions and worldviews in
ways we cannot fully anticipate, self-reflection and aware-
ness of our epistemology becomes ever more important for
machine learning practitioners and researchers to ensure that
automated decision-making systems contribute in beneficial
and sustainable ways.
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